Introduction

•
Consider a price discovery process in a financial market where traders submit orders to the system for a certain period of time before (be opening (say one hour or one hour and a halO and theoretical market-clearing prices are quoted periodically as orders accumulate. Such information tatonnement processes are used in the preopening period of continuous, computerized trailing systems in several exchanges (for example, in the Paris Bourse. Toronto Stock Exchange. Bolsa de Madrid, or the Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX)). No trade is made until the end of the tatonnement, and at any point agents may revise their orders. This preopening auction is designed to decrease the uncertainty about prices after a period without trade.' !n the Deutsche Borse with the Xetra system, there is an opening auction that begins with a call phase in which traders can enter and/or modify or delete existing orders before the (short) price determination phase. The indicative auction price is displayed when orders are executable.^ However, it has been claimed that this type of price discovery process may result in gaming and manipulation because traders can revise their orders at no cost. (See Stoll and Whaley, 1990, and Madhavan and Panchapagesan, an order may rise as the opening approaches (as in the Arizona Stock Exchange), or time priority advantages may be established. (See, for example, Economides and Schwartz (1995) .) In the Paris Bourse, for example, there is a limited hut significant role for time priority (especially since June 1995). Similarly, activity rules have been proposed in the design of electricity markets (as the California Power Exchange) to prevent gaming and encourage the convergence to an efficient outcome (Wilson. 1997) .
Another, somewhat more exotic, instance in which it must he explained why agents submit orders early is parimutuel horse betting. Bettors put money on a horse and bet against each other. Investors in a winning horse keep the money invested and obtain a share of all the money invested in the losing horses (minus the racetrack's cut). During a period bets can be placed at any time until the race starts. The odds are displayed every minute. The reported (win) odds for a horse are the return (net of getting the invested money hack) per dollar invested. Obviously, the only odds that matter are the final ones (computed with the total amounts wagered) when the race starts. The temporal pattern of cumulated betting on horses resembles the pattern of orders in the preopening tatonnement. rising sharply toward the end (Camerer. 1998) . However, early betting is not insignificant and seems difficult to explain, since an early bettor faces some price risk unless the bet is cancelled before the start (something that is allowed at only some racetracks). The possibility of cancellation enhances tbe prospect of market manipulation.
Field studies suggest that parimutuel betting is an efficient aggregator of information (see, forexample. Thaler and Ziembra( 1988) ). That is, the odds that result from the betting are closely related to the horses' relative frequencies of winning. Favorites that pay low odds win often, while "longshots" that pay high odds win only occasionally. (A small longshot bias has been reported, however: tbe odds on longshots are somewhat too high.) Experimental results by Plott, Wit, and Yang (1997) are consistent with the Held evidence. In their experimental design, individuals are endowed with private information and given the needed computations based on Bayes' rule. In the experiment, markets open simultaneously, odds are available every minute, and all markets are closed simultaneously at a random time within a preset interval without warning. It is found that most volume concentrates close to the first time at which the market can close. Furthermore, there is some limited evidence in the experiments of market-manipulation attempts (which impair informational efficiency). (See also Noth and Weber (1996) .) Tbe field experiment conducted by Camerer (1998) concludes that temporary large bets, which are cancelled before tbe start, move the odds of the horses but the net effect is statistically insignificant. That is. In no period (be it prebet or postbet) do other bettors respond systematically to the temporary bets of tbe "manipulator" with respect to a baseline of matcbed-pair control horses in ihe same race. There does not seem to be evidence of the effectiveness of manipulation in this context, despite the fact that interventions closer to tbe opening moved the odds more.T he results are interpreted as tbe parimutuel markets being good aggregators of information.
In tbe present article, as in Vives (1995) . we assume tbat at any stage in the process there Is a positive probability tbat the market opens and trade is realized, and with tbe complementary probability tbe tatonnement continues. It is reasonable to suppose tbat tbe probability that the market opens is increasing as tbe tatonnement progresses. Tbe assumption is somewbat crude, but it has tbe advantage of yielding a tractable model.'^ Furthermore, in some actual markets it is descriptive. In the Xetra system of the Deutsche Bbrse at the opening, intraday, and closing auctions there is a call phase with a random end (after a minimum initial period). Tbe stated objective of the random end of tbe call pbase is to avoid price manipulation.'" Our model, despite ' As the aiilhor noles. however, the manipulation tesl is a test of a joint hypolhesis of ignorance of the existence of a manipulator, noticeabiiity of the bets, asymmetry of reaction to the piauement and cancellation of ihe manipulating bets, and some specific behavioral assumptions about the population of bettors.
'^The assumption is similar in spirit to the exogenous random delays in communicating oflers in the model of bargaining with deadlines of Ma and Manove 11993) . In this context, players begin fosend offers when there is a positive probability that an offer may arrive after the deadline ha,s expired.
'" All these auctions have three phases: call, in which orders can be entered or preexisting orders modified or cancelled; price determination; and order book balancing. Volatility inlerruptions may occur during auctions or cnntinuous being close to tbe Xetra call auctions, is better seen as a parable to explain some driving forces of tbe actual preopening price discovery process, but it does not purport to match it exactly. Tbe model does illuminate, for example, whether and bow a random opening of the markets controls price manipulation by informed large traders.
Our tatonnement was Inspired by some dynamic adjustment processes to implement rationalexpectations equilibria (Jordan, 1982, I98.'>, and Kobayashi, 1977) . Tbe model presented is akin to the dynamic trading model of Kyle (1985) with two variations: the addition of a competitive sector of risk-averse privately informed agents and the absence of trade unless tbe market opens, and this happens witb a specified probability at any stage m the process. Tbe model can also be seen as the tatonnement in Vives (1995) with tbe addition of a risk-neutral large informed trader.
We obtain the following results: Tbe strategic informed trader may bave an incentive to manipulate the market at the beginning of the tatonnement. Tbe reason is tbat by doing so tbe strategic informed trader can keep tbe market price uninformative, while the probability tbat tbe market opens is low, in order to trade aggressively when the market is likely to open. Tbe way to manipulate the market is by taking an opposite position to the competitive informed agents, wbo trade according to their information. In this way, if the strategic informed trader sees that the liquidation value of the asset is bigb relative to public information, be will place an order to sell to compensate the orders of tbe competitive traders wbo will be buying in tbe aggregate. Tbe cost of manipulating tbe market is low wben tbe probability tbat tbe market opens is low and this happens at the beginning of tbe tatonnement. Indeed, we find tbat if the probability tbat the market opens is very low, the strategic informed trader will always manipulate tbe market and will make tbe market price almost uninformative about tbe liquidation value of the risky asset.
We also find tbat tbe trading intensity of tbe large informed trader is increasing in tbe probability tbat tbe market opens. We see therefore that a random opening time does not eliminate price manipulation but limits it. Indeed, for a large enougb opening probability, tbe strategic trader does not manipulate (in the sense of trading against the information be bas) tbe market. Witbout the presence of competitive informed traders, the strategic informed trader would bave incentives to respond little to his information at the beginning, to keep prices uninformative, but there would be no need to manipulate tbe market. In any case, tbe informativeness of prices is kept low until the end of tbe tatonnement, at whicb time it increases sbarply.
Using simulations of the model, we obtain three important results consistent witb tbe empirical evidence (and for a natural specification of tbe sequence of probabilities determining tbe likelihood of tbe market opening). First, price precision is a strictly convex function of n, and therefore the rate of increase of the price precision increases with n in contrast witb the competitive case. Furthermore, it is easy to produce estimates of the speed of learning of the order obtained by Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) . Information revelation accelerates as the tatonnement progresses due to tbe activity of tbe strategic informed trader. Second, tbe market price does not converge to tbe fundamental value no matter bow long the borizon of tbe tatonnement. Third, for plausible parameter configurations, total expected trading volume is U-sbaped. Tbis is driven by tbe presence of tbe strategic informed trader and his manipulative trading pattern.
The three results contrast witb tbe case where there is no strategic informed trader (Vives, 1995) . Tben the rate of increase of tbe price precision is linear, and the price does converge to tbe fundamental value as tbe borizon of tbe tatonnement lengthens. Tbe presence of the strategic infortned trader sets a definite upper bound on tbe information content of prices. Furthermore, expected trading volume is decreasing because tbe volume traded by competitive agents tends to decrease.
The simulations also show that in an economy in which tbe strategic informed trader is smaller, be responds more to bis private information, prices reveal more information and are more volatile, and there is more trading. A more competitive market is associated witb improved informational efficiency and more trading. It is also wortb mentioning tbat the competitive informed trading when prices lie outside certain predetermined price ranges, A volatility interruption is followed by an extended call phase, which also terminates randomly.
traders benefit from the presence of tbe strategic informed trader, because tben prices tend to be less informative and the competitive agents can profit more from tbeir infonnation. Conversely, tbe strategic informed trader would like tbe competitive sector to be nonexistent or as small as possible.
It is assumed that all random variables are normally distributed and that the competitive informed traders display CARA utilities. Attention is concentrated in linear equilibria." The model is developed under tbe assumption (as in Kyle (1985) and Vives (1995) ) tbat informed agents (competitive and strategic) submit market orders. We have also checked tbat the general pattern of results obtained in the article holds wben tbe competitive informed agent and the strategic informed trader submit demand schedules.
Tbe present work is also related to tbe stock-price manipulation literature. Tbis literature can be classified according to wbetber manipulation is based on actions that change tbe value (or tbe perceived value) of the asset, or on releasing misleading information, or purely on trade. Examples of tbe first type are given in Vila (1989) . of the second type in Vila (1989) and Benabou and Laroque (1992) , and of tbe tbird type in Hart (1977) , Jarrow (1992) , Allen and Gale (1992) , Allen and Gorton (1992) . Kumar and Seppi (1992) , Fisbman and Hagerty (1995), and Bninnermeier (1998) .'-Our model belongs to tbe tbird class, with trade-based manipulation. In our case, however, tbe objective of tbe strategic informed trader, who bas accurate infonnation on the liquidation value of tbe asset (and otber agents know this), is to neutralize tbe informative trades tbat competitive informed agents make. It is thus not the case, as it is in Allen and Gale (1992) or Fisbman and Hagerty (1995) . tbat an uninformed manipulator can pretend to be informed to manipulate tbe price and make money.
Contrarian bebavior is obtained in two instances in the literature. John and Narayanan (1997) develop a variation of the model of Fisbman and Hagerty (1995) in whicb mandatory disclosure of trades of corporate insiders gives them, under certain assumptions, incentives to manipulate the market using a contrarian strategy. ' ^ Foster and Viswanatban (1994) provide an example of a duopoly where information has a common and a private component and where tbe better-informed agent tries to minimize the learning of tbe lesser-informed one. Tbis market manipulation may lead to contrarian bebavior by the better-informed trader if the private and common signals have very disparate realizations (something tbat happens witb low probability and therefore does not happen on average). Finally, Hillion and Suominen (1998a) explain tbe incentives of brokers to manipulate the prices at tbe close to "look good" In front of customers. Evidence of strategic behavior at tbe close of the Paris Bourse is provided in Hillion and Suominen (1998b) .
Our results also suggest tbat strategic bebavior may impair tbe informational efficiency of market mecbanisms even wben attention is concentrated in tbe class of linear ("separatitig") equilibria, reinforcing the point made by Laffont and Maskin (1990) , who argue that pooling equilibria may obtain In a context witb multiple equilibria.
In Section 2 we present tbe price discovery process. Section 3 cbaracterizes tbe dynamic equilibrium, and Section 4 analyzes two extreme economies, competitive and monopolistic. Section 5 studies tbe general model, establishes tbe manipulation result, and presents tbe simulation analysis of the dynamic behavior of tbe model. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. Tbe Appendix gathers some of the proofs.
" Wilh normal distribuiions it is an open question whether nonlinear equilibria exist in Kyle (1985) as well as in our nnxiel. In the Kyle model, however, when the insider submits a demand schedule, there is a unique equilibrium (linear Liniler the normality assumption) both in slalic (Rochet and Vila, 1994) and dynamic (Back, 1992) settings.
'-For example. Allen and Gorton (1992) explain price manipulation by an uninformed agent in the presence of asymmetries in noise trading (noise selling is more likely tban noise buying) or in wbetber buyers or sellers are infonned (wilh shon-sale constraints, exploiting good news is easier than exploiting bad news).
' •* Important ingredienis of their model are that agents want lo trade only one unit, the fundamental value follows a Iwo-state di.stribution, and market makers fix prices before seeing the order flow.
A price discovery process
• Consider a market with a single risky asset with random (ex post) liquidation value v and a riskless asset with unitary return traded among noise traders, a continuum of risk-averse competitive informed agents of mass (1 -/i), and a large informed trader of mass }x with the intermediation of competitive market makers.
The strategic informed trader acts strategically, that is, he takes into account the effect his demand has on prices. For simplicity, we assume that he is risk neutral and observes the liquidation value v in advance. His profits when buying ^v units of the asset at price p are given hy7T={v-p)fiy. His initial wealth is normalized to zero. The strategic informed trader submits a market order contingent on the information he has.
There is a continuum of competitive informed agents indexed in the interval [fi. 1] (endowed with the Lebesgue measure). Each competitive informed agent has a little piece of (private) information about the unknown v. The profits of agent ( buying Xj units of the asset at price p are given by JTJ = (v -p)x,. Informed agents are risk averse and have CARA utilities: f/(jrj) = -exp{-/3jr,}, where p > 0 is the coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion. The initial wealth of informed agents is also normalized to zero. Informed agent / submits a market order contingent on the information he receives.
Noise traders (in the aggregate) submit an order w. Market makers are risk neutral and set prices efficiently conditional on the observation of the "order flow."
The horizon is tinite (A^ periods). Price discovery is modelled as an information tatonnement.'"^ Al stage n there is a positive probability /" that the market opens, the value v is realized, and trade occurs (given that there has not been trade before stage n). with the complementary probability (I -y,t) that there is no trade and the tatonnement continues. We assume that the sequence { /" } is nondecreasing and, obviously, that YN = U since at n = N the market opens for sure if it has not done so before.
Suppose that at the beginning of stage n the market has not opened. Then the competitive informed agents and the strategic informed trader, before knowing whether there will be trade in the period, have the opportunity to submit market orders to the competitive market-making sector. These orders supersede previous orders, which are understood to be cancelled if the market does not open.'"T he strategic informed trader's information is given by {v, p""'}. where p"~^ = {p] Pn-[) is the sequence of past prices. His market order is of the type Y,, (v, p""^) . The information of competitive informed agent / is given by {sj. p"~'}, where Sj is his private signal about u, and his market order is of the type X^iisi. p""'). Noise traders submit the aggregate order «". Alternatively, we could think that noise comes from a garbled communication channel in the transmission of orders or from the aggregation procedure of the order flow. In this case, market makers have a noisy observation of the order flow. "* The order flow is then <o,, = fiy,, + x,, + w,,, where x,, = f X,,iisi. p""^) di is the aggregate demand of the competitive informed agents. Competitive market makers set p,, = ^(i' | w"), where w" = (&j|, ...,co,,) . That is. /?" is equal to the expectation of v conditional on public information (including the current order flow w,,).'^ If the market opens at stage n. v is realized, trade occurs, and this is the end of the story. Otherwise the tatonnement continues. All trades are notional until the market opens. Informed traders can revise their orders before the market opens. In general they will have incentives to do so once they receive more public information, since this '^This is a finite-horizon version of the tatonnement process in Vive.s (1995) with the addition of a large informed trader.
'-'' The tnodel as stated also encotnpa.sse.s the case in which only the orders of noise traders are cancelled if the market does not open.
"^ In Gould and Verrecchia (1985) . for example, ihe price quoted by Ihe specialist is garbled. '^ Eliicicnt pricing would be the outcome of Bertrandcompelition among risk-neulral market makers who observe the order flow.
helps them to predict better the net value v -p. Furthermore, the strategic informed trader may be able to manipulate the information contained in prices and may have incentives to do so.
All random variables are assumed to be normally distributed with the sequence {u,} independently and identically distributed with zero mean and variance a~. The signal 5, is given by Si = v+Ei, where v -N(v.o;) (v. u,,) = cov(if.,) = cov(e,. «") = cov(ei.8j) = 0,j y/, for all n. That is, the liquidation value u, the error terms of signals, and the sequence {u,} are mutually independent.
and s, '^ N{().a;) with cov
We will use the usual convention that given v, the average signal of the competitive informed agents s = [1/(1 -M)]/^, Sjdi equals almost surely v (i.e.. errors cancel out in the aggregate, f^^ Sjdi = 0). In other words, the pooled information of informed agents reveals i.-. We can interpret the strategic informed trader of size /i as emerging from a coalition of small informed traders (of measure p) who decide to form a cartel of investors and pool their information.
The information tatonnement serves the purpose of eliciting information about the fundamental value of the asset. The notional prices quoted by the market makers convey noisy infortiiation, because of noise trading, about v. The described process matches those cases in which the market opens at a randomly specified time (like in the Xetra auctions) and otherwise is a crude idealization of the preopening price discovery processes in the other exchange markets described in Section 1. In the latter cases the real pattern of tatonnement from, say, 8:30 to 10:30 A.M. and opening at 10:00 A.M. could be approximated smoothly by a sequence of probabilities {y^} approximating a step function with no trade before 10:00 A.M and opening at 10:00 A.M. Furthermore, the possibility of a communication breakdown at some point (with increasing probability as the opening approaches), implying that the standing order "sticks" and cannot be revised, parallels the possibility of the market's opening at any point in the process (but with increasing probability as the end of the horizon approaches).'^ In consequence, a central case is when the probability Yn is of the "breakdown" type and is given by y,, = y^-", where y is an exogenous constant that lies in the interval (0, 1). This implies that y,, is strictly increasing and strictly convex in n.
For a large horizon, the probability that the market opens is very small at the beginning for any y < 1. For y low, the probability that the market opens, y,,, stays low until the very end. For example, if y = .1, then K,V_2 = 1%, y^-\ = 10%, and yj^ = 100%. For y high, the probability that the market opens approaches one in a less abrupt way. For example, if y = .7, then j/^_2 = 49%, y^_| = 70%, and y/^j = 100%. For y close to one and a short horizon, j/,, stays close to one for any n. For a moderate-horizon N, it is reasonable to choose y not too high so that the probability of trade is low at the beginning. For example, with y = .5 and N = 10 we have that y, = 2%, 75 = 3%. yg = 25%, and /g = 50%.
Equilibrium in the dynamic market
• We now study the dynamics of the price discovery process in which the informed agents compete with the strategic informed trader.
We restrict attention to linear equilibria. In consequence, the normality of the order flow is preserved and /?" = £(1' | aj") is a sufficient statistic in the estimation of i' with respect to the information {co"}. It follows that Eiv \ p,,) = p^ and prices follow a martingale: E{p,, /?""') = /?"_!. As we shall see. it is easily shown that p,, = k,,a),, + /)"_], where as usual (An)"' is an index of the depth of the market. The conditional volatility of prices is given bŷ^{
where Tn ^ lvar(D I pn)]~^ is the precision of the price in the estimation of i; (let po = i)).'Â t stage n a strategy for competitive agent / is a function that maps his private information Si and the observed past prices p""' into desired purchases: Xinis^, pn-\). The agent will face the "* * II niusi he pointed out that our mode! does nol match exactly the communication breakdown story, since in the latter a trader has a certain iruiividiuit probdbWhy ofbeing cut off from the market, whereas in our model the market opens or not tor everybody.
' "^ The precision ol a random variable jr. (oij"', will be denoted in general by TJ.
following expected utility conditional on his information {.v,. p""'} : y,, E{U{7Ti,,) (1 -yn)E{un I Si, Pn-\}. where JT,,, = (L--p,,).v,-,,. UiTZi,,) = -exp{-p;r;n}, and u,, is the (random) continuation utility, which, given that the agent is negligible, is independent of the current marketorder.v,,,.Theagentbehavesasif the asset were to be liquidated and trade realized in the period. From the point of view of a competitive agent, the only difference between periods is in the information available. In consequence, a competitive agent will behave myopically and will optimize choosing a market order with the usual form in a CARA-normal model (the strategy is symmetric given that signals have the same precision):
At stage n a strategy for the strategic informed trader is a function that maps his private information V and the observed past prices /?""' into desired purchases. He knows that the asset will be liquidated and trade realized in the period with probability y,, and with probability (1 -/") he will obtain the continuation (expected) profit which depends on his market order in period n. At stage n the strategic informed trader will face the following expected profit conditional on his information:
where E{7T^+] \ i'. p""'} is the expected continuation profit (which depends on the current and the past market orders).
Restricting attention to equilibria in linear strategies, it is possible to obtain a full characterization of equilibrium behavior in our model with risk-averse competitive agents and a large informed trader. Corollary I. At a linear equilibrium the following inequalities hold for all n: 0 < a,, < TJP,
Proof. It is a modification of the arguments in Kyle (1985) and Vives (1995) . See the Appendix.
To show existence and uniqueness of the linear equilibrium in the general model is quite a cumbersome task.-*^ We conjecture that the linear equilibrium exists and is unique for all parameter configurations. The conjecture is based on the fact thai the re.sult holds when n =0 (Vives, 1995) , when n = 1 (see Section 5). and also when N = 2 and yi is close to zero. The systematic simulations performed in a wide range of parameter values have always produced a unique (linear) equilibrium (see Section 6).
We have assumed that informed traders use market orders. However, when the strategic informed trader and the competitive informed agents use demand schedules (demand functions) as strategies, linear equilibria have a very similar characterization. A difference is that with demand schedules the competitive traders set the same (positive) trading intensity at any period, /t(/?H;*V-P"~') =«(-v, ~ Pn)^ where a = p~^T^. This is so because now that competitive traders can condition on the current price, the conditional price volatility does not influence their trading intensity. In this case it is possible to establish existence and uniqueness in the class of linear equilibria (see Proposition Al in the Appendix for a characterization of the equilibrium with demand schedules).-' The model with market orders allows for richer dynamics due to the evolving strategy of competitive informed traders.
The question arises about whether the strategic informed frader may have incentives to introduce noise in his order. As in Kyle (1985) , it does not pay to introduce noise. The reason is that the strategic informed trader is optimizing at any stage against a fixed conjecture on the behavior of market makers, that is. a fixed lambda. For a given market depth, it is optimal not to introduce noise in the order, since the only effect of placing a noisy order is just to distort trade from its optimal level given v. Put in other words, suppose there is an equilibrium with positive noise added to the strategic informed trader's market order at some stage. Then it pays the strategic informed trader to reduce the noise to zero, because this deviation is unob.servable, and trade according to his information v.
Suppose that the strategic informed trader in period n can add to his order normally distributed noise r),, uncorrelated with all other random variables, with mean zero and variance a; . The strategic informed trader at stage n draws a realization of ?;" and places the order fj. (Yn{v, pn-] ) + r},,). The other agents do not observe tT, y but have a conjecture (in equilibrium, correct) about the strategic informed trader's choice of a,^ . At stage N the optimal level of added noise is zero because it cannot affect market depth (derived from the fixed conjecture of market makers) and it distorts trading. The reasoning then applies to stage N -1 and so on. The expected profit of the strategic informed trader in period n can be written as 0(i', /'"-1) -X^/i{y,, -(I -y,, )fik,, H,, ]G;^^ , where 0 is a linear function of v and /?"_ i and the parameters A. and Hn are as in Proposition 1. From the second-order condition we have that )'" -(1 -y,,)//A,, H,, > 0 and therefore the optimal amount of noise is a^ = 0.
For further reference, we now characterize trading volume. We define the total volume traded at stage n. which will be denoted by T V,,. as the sum of the absolute values of the demands coming from the different agents in the model divided by 2. That is, the expectation of the total volume traded at stage n is given by ETV,, = where j^ \xi,,\di, Xin = Xjsi. p^_\) is the volume traded by the continuum of informed agents, lASnl-yri = y,iiv, p/,-i) is the volume traded by the strategic informed trader, \w,,\ is the volume " To find ihe equilibrium, we have to solve a difference equation system with N periods and 2 unk.nown.s in each period. This is complicated because ihe system cannot be iterated backward a.s in Kyle {t985) or Holden and Subrahtnanyam (1992) or forward as in Vives (1995) .
-' The proof ol"existence and uniqueness with demand schedules follows the same logic a.s in Kyle (1985) . That is. we can find a way to iterate the dynamic equation system backward. The reason is that the responsiveness to signals of the competitive informed traders is constant through time.
traded hy the market makers, and the coutiterpart of the order flow co,, -j x-md; + /^y,; + w^, and \u,,\ is the trading volume coming from the noise traders. Note that because of symmetry, the expected aggregate volume traded by informed agents is E\j \xin\di\ = {I -(x)E\x,n\. The behavior of the total trading volume is driven by the behavior of the volume traded by informed (competitive plus strategic) agents. The following lemma provides the equilibrium expressions of trading volume.
Lemma I. In equilibrium.
E\y,,
J/2 and Proof. See the Appendix.
The study of the dynamics of the market parameters of interest, like the responsiveness of agents to information, market depth, price precision, volatility, and trading volume, is complex. Before tackling the general case, we will begin hy examining the properties of two extreme cases: The competitive economy (/^ = 0, as in Vives (1995) ) and the monopolistic economy where the unique informed agent is a large informed trader (/i = 1).
Two extreme economies: Competitive and monopolistic
• Let us start with the case in which there is no strategic informed trader (/x = 0). The following comes from Proposition 5.1 in Vives (1995) : At the unique linear equilibrium, as N tends to infinity, a^ converges monotonically from below to (pa})~', T, V and A.^' tend to infinity at a rate of A', warpN converges monotonically from below to tr,^. and var{p/v ] PN-\] tends to zero, E\x^i\ converges from ahove to (2/K)^^-{pa^y^ and ETV^ converges from above to At the equilibrium, an informed competitive agent buys or sells according to whether the private signal received is larger or smaller than the public signal. The dynamics of the market are explained as follows. As N grows, prices become more informative about L' in a linear way (T,V increases as N does). The competitive market-making sector increases the depth of the market, andX^' grows also at the rate of A'. The conditional variance of prices decreases and induces each informed agent to respond more to his information. The volatility of price quotations increases, since they incorporate more information, and the indicative volume of trade of informed agents decreases, since their information advantage with respect to the market makers disappears as prices become more informative. In fact, the aggregate volume of trade of informed agents against market makers E\XN\, where x^ = f^y ^n(-^/. Pn--\)di. equals (2/7r)''^aA'{l/7N-i)'^^ and tends to zero with A'. In the limit, informed agents lo.se all information advantage.
From the fact that the precision of prices grows linearly with N, it is immediate that /j/v converges to y at a rate of \/\/N (more precisely, it can be shown that \/N(PN -v) converges in distribution to i' V(O. r{~p~a^)} Let us now compare the purely monopolistic version of the model where the unique informed agent is a large informed trader (that is, /i = 1) with the competitive economy (fj. = 0). Proposition 2 is a specialization of Proposition 1 letting fi = I and showing the existence and uniqueness of a linear equilibrium. Lemma Al in the Appendix provides an iterative method to compute the equilibrium. It follows from Lemma Al that r,,/rr = 2"n','=|[l -A,//,{I -y,)/y,\ and that the sequence {A,//,} is determined by the sequence {A,}. Therefore, the sequence {r,,/r|.} only depends on the sequence {A,, }. This means in particular that price precision and market depth are independent of noise trading. As in Kyle (1985) . the result is aconseqtience of the risk neutrality of the strategic informed trader. It also follows that 2 < Tn/r,, < 2".
The strategic informed trader trades according to Y,,(v. p"~^) = «,,(i; -p,,-\). At stage u, if he places a market order and there is no trade, his future profit will decrease because of the information revealed to the market makers. But if he does not submit any order and trade is consummated, his future profit will be zero because v will have been revealed. It never pays to set a negative trading intensity or,,. Indeed, a,, < 0 is dominated by a,, = 0: If there is trade, with a,, < 0 the strategic informed trader makes negative profits while il makes zero with «" = 0; if there is no trade, with «" = 0 no information is revealed to the market makers while with a,, < 0 some information is revealed. In fact, when y,, = 0 it is optimal not to trade (and set a,, = ()), since the market will not open. The optimal market order, which balances the two effects. implies a trading intensity that is lower than in the one-shot model where there is trading with probability one. Moreover, it seems intuitive that a,, should be increasing in the probability /" (this is eonfirmed by the simulations below). In the oue-shot model of Kyle (1985) , X\a\ = 1/2. In our monopolistic economy. k,,a,, < 1/2 for all n < N and X^-a/v = 1/2 (since at t = N the model becomes static, as in Kyle). This means that the large informed agent refrains from trading too aggressively because there is a positive probability that there is no trade.
An important result is that for the central case where y,, = y^^'\ and in contrast to the competitive economy, no matter how long the horizon, the price precision is bounded above (and the bound depends only on the parameter y). In this case the monopolistic strategic informed trader prevents the full revelation of v no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has. The following corollary states the result.
Corollary 2. If y,, = y^ '" for any given y. then there is N such that for N > N, increases in A' just move the schedule r,, (as a function of n) to the right. In particular, T/ V -T^ for N > N. Let z{y) be the limit value of the price precision. Then f(y)/r,, is increasing, convex with f(0) = 0. and tends to infinity as y tends to one. The proof of the corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2 and Lemma Al. The function f(y) is computable. For example, f(.4) = 2.8T,, and A'(.4) = 10, f(.6) = 5.4T,, and^( .6) = 18, f(.8) = 50.6T,, and /V(.8) = 49. f{.9) = 6086,2T,. However, it is easy to construct sequences of probabilities yn such that f is infinite. Indeed, just let. for all n, y,, be close to one. For example. /" = }/"_] + (.l/N) is increasing with y,, > .9, and TA^ grows exponentially with N. This type of probabilities sequence is not reasonable for our purposes, given that there is a very high probability that the market opens in every period. The key property for the result in the corollary to hold is that the probability that the market opens, y,,. tends to zero as the number of rounds until the opening N -n tends to infinity.
We shall now present a simulation analysis and discussion of the main properties of the equilibrium of the monopolistic version of the model, comparing it with the competitive version and assuming the same time horizon in hoth cases.
In the numerical examples in Figures 1-3 , it is assumed that y,, = {y)^~", N = 30, a^ = (TJ = I, y = ,7, p = 2, and a^ = .25. Here are the results we obtain. a
Responsiveness to private information. In both the competitive and the monopolistic equilibria, the responsiveness to private information increases monotonically with n (see Figure  1 ). For n small, the strategic informed trader's responsiveness to private information a,, is very clo.se to zero, since the probability that there will be trade is low at those stages. In the competitive equilibrium, the aggregate responsiveness to private information a,, increases to a = TfJp. The response of the strategic informed trader may overtake that of the competitive agents close to the end of the horizon, provided the private signals of the competitive agents are not very precise {Zg, low).
n Informative ness of prices. In the competitive economy, T^ increases monotonically at a rate of n. in the monopolistic equilibrium, r,, is also monotonically increasing, but the rate of increase accelerates close to the opening (see Figure 2) . In general, the informativeness of prices is higher in the competitive equilihrium for n small, because at those rounds of the tatonnement process the monopolist strategic informed trader is very reluctant to submit orders. But for n close to A', when the probability that there will he trade is relatively high, the informativeness of prices may be higher in the monopolistic equilibrium. This is more likely to happen if the noise in the private signals of the agents in the competitive economy is high. For A' large, however, we know that the price precision in the competitive economy must dominate the one in the monopolistic economy, since the former grows without bound while the latter is bounded.
• Market depth. In the competitive equilibrium, the depth of the market O.,,)"' tends to intinity at a rate of n. In the monopolistic equilibrium, the market depth in general decreases during the first rounds of the tatonnement process and then increases as the probabil ity that there will be trade tends to one. If « is small, the probability that there will be trade is relatively low. As a consequence, the strategic informed trader's trading intensity (a,,) is low, and the market is quite deep because the order flow is likely to reflect the demand of the noise traders. In this case the market makers are willing to trade because the adverse selection problem they face is not severe. As n increases, the strategic informed trader behaves more aggressively {because of the higher probability of trading), the order flow is more likely to reflect the demand of the strategic informed trader, the market makers are less willing to trade, and market depth decreases. Finally, if /( is large and close to A', the market makers have a very good estimate of v because of the success of the tatonnement process, and the strategic informed trader's informational advantage is small."" -An increase in «" has two contradictory effects on market depth. The first is positive by making the order flow more informative about v. which tends lo reduce the informational disadvantage of the market makers. The siecond is D Unconditional volatility of prices. In both the competitive and the monopolistic economies, the unconditional volatility of prices warp,, increases monotonicaliy toward cr,-. In the competitive economy., however, var/?,, gets close to CTJ in the tirst few rounds of tatonnement but at the same time is close to zero in the monopolistic economy (because the market depth is extremely high).~-n Expected trading volume. In the competitive economy, the expected volume traded by informed agents is decreasing tor n large. On the contrary, the expected volume traded by the strategic informed trader in the monopolistic economy increases monotonicaliy. The rate of increase is very low tor n small, and then it accelerates as n gets close to N (and as the probability that there will be trade approaches one). This qualitative feature of the monopolist equilibrium has been found to be robust to wide parameter ranges (provided that the sequence of probabilities {}/"} has the form proposed, y,, = y^-")}-* u should be clear that
negaiive becau.se the order flow is more likely lo reflect the demand of the strategic Inrormcd trader, which tends to make more severe the adverse selection probleni laced by the market makers. The second (tirst) effect dominates when a,, and n are small (large).^ While it is clear that the volatility of prices is higher in ihe competilive equilibrium for n small, thi.*; volatility may become larger in the monopolist equilibrium for n close lo N and N not too large. (This is more likely to happen if the noise in the private signals of the agents in the competitive economy is high.)
•^''The result depends on the form of the sequence of probabilitie.s {/"}• For example, if the sequence is constant (yn = Y for all n except y/v = D and N is large, the expected volume traded by the monopolist informed trader may decrease for n small and then increa.se as n gets close to N.
will be increasing if the rate of increase of cf,, is sufflciently high, even though the informativeness of prices r,,_i increases with n as well.
The volume traded by informed agents drives the expectation of the total trading volume. This decreases to a constant {{2/27T)^^~{\/(afP) + 2a,t}) in the competitive model, while it increases monotonically in the monopolistic model. But since the volume traded by noise traders is constant in both models, the rate of increase of the total volume as n gets close to A' is lower than the rate of increase of the volume traded by the monopolistic informed agent (see Figure 3) .
The dynamics in the general case: market manipulation
•
The most remarkable property of the equilibrium strategies (given in Proposition 1) when the strategic informed trader and the competitive informed sector coexist is that the strategic informed trader's responsiveness to private information may be negative for n not too close to the end of the horizon. A negative response to private information may be interpreted as an attempt to manipulate the market. This is so because the strategic informed trader does something that is opposite to what his private information suggests, namely, at stage n to buy when v < /?"_] and to sell when v > p,i-\. Indeed, the strategic informed trader'sdemand is given by/iKn(i;, /J"~') = tia,, (v -p,,_i) , so that if a,, < 0. the strategic informed trader's demand is negative if and only if V > p,,-\. That is. if cf,, < 0. the strategic informed trader submits a sell order when the liquidation value of the asset is "high" and the expected return conditional in his information is positive. The purpose of doing so is to manipulate the informativeness of prices. It is an attempt to counteract the information incorporated in prices arising from the demands of the competitive informed agents. Indeed, if prices are very informative with a few rounds of latonnement, due to the activity of the competitive informed agents, then the strategic informed trader's opportunities to make a killing are greatly diminished. In general, the more information market makers have, the more (informationally) efficient the price is and the lower the speculative profits of informed traders are.
How can the strategic informed trader manipulate the informativeness of prices (and the depth of the market)? The intormaliveness of the price and the depth of the market depend on the average of the trading intensities of the strategic and the competitive informed agents, A,, = l/za,, + (I -ii)a,,] . Indeed, r,, = r,,_j + T,,(A,,)-and (A,,}"' = A,, + (T,,_ ]/ (Z,,A,,) ). The c(5mpetitive informed agents will set a positive trading intensity provided their signals have positive precision, r^ > 0. By setting a negative a,,, the strategic informed trader can decrease A,,. However, it never pays the strategic informed trader to let A,, < 0. Indeed, the aggregate response to private information A,, is always nonnegative in equilibrium. To let A,, < 0, the strategic informed trader should choose a,, < -(1 -/i)a,,/^. But choosing a,, < -(1 -(i)an/(i is worse than choosing a,, = -(1 -ii)a,,l n. since the expected loss incase trade is realized would be higher, and the futtire expected profit in case there is no trading would be lower (because if a,, < -(1 -fi)Un/fj, the price does reveal some information, while if a,, = -(1 -ij.)a,,/ii., it does not).
When will Ihe strategic informed trader manipulate the market? We shall see that if at stage n y,, is sufficiently low, a,, < 0. In particular. \i •/" = 0, then a,, = -(1 -ii)a,,l(i and A,, = 0. If a,, > 0, then »" < 0.-'' Indeed, if the probability of trade being realized {y,,} is zero, the strategic informed trader's optimal response is to choose a trading intensity a,, such that the price p,, is uninformative (A,, = X,, = 0 and p,, = p,,-\) . When there is no danger of the market opening, the strategic informed trader trades in a way that no information is revealed by neutralizing the response of competitive informed agents. Given that A,, = fia,, + (I -^kv,,, with a,, > 0 and 0 < ( U < 1. this is done by setting a,, = -l( 1 -i.i)/ij,\a,, < 0.-'^ It is plausible then to expect -^ Obviously, if j/,, = Oforn < A', in equilibrium, lhe competitive agenis may put any weight on their information.^
The result can be checked with ihe first-order condilion of the strategic informed irader's maximization problem at / = n < A': [I -(1 -iJ.) that «" < 0 for y,, low. It can be shown that if y\ is small enough, then at a linear equilibrium necessarily a\ < 0. and therefore there is manipulation.-^ An important consequence, consistent with the simulations reported below, is that in the central case (y,, = y^~"} for A' large, we wiil have market manipulation, a,, < 0, in the first periods of the tatonnement. At stage n < N.if 0 < y,, < \, the strategic informed trader faces the following tradeoff. If trade were consummated, the optimal action would be to trade as in the static model, choosing a,, positive and relatively high. If the market were not to open, the optimal response would be to choose a trading intensity a,, so as to make the price p,, uninformative (A,, = 0 and /?" = Pn-i)-He must balance reducing the informativeness of prices by choosing a low (and possibly negative) trading intensity a,, and trading intensely (choosing «" close to the static equilibrium value) to obtain a high profit if trades arc executed. If y,, = I, the strategic informed trader behaves as in the static version of the model so that his response to private information is positive.
At any stage, the strategic informed trader's responsiveness to private information should be increasing in the probability of trading at that stage. If the strategic informed trader manipulates the market {a,, < 0) and trade is realized, he will have an expected loss. But if there is no trading, the strategic informed trader's future expected profit will be higher, since he will preserve a greater informational advantage over other market participants. At stage n, the strategic informed trader's incentives to manipulate the market should be decreasing in the probability of trading y,,. orequivalently, a,, increasing in y,,. By the same token, and since y,, is increasing inn, an should be increasing in n.
We now present a simulation analysis of the main properties of the equilibrium in the general model.^'^ We have explored the behavior of the model with /" = y^~" in the following parameter grid: p in {1, 2, 4}, T,,, T,. and z, in {.5, 1.2}. y in {.2. .3. .5, .6, .7, .8}, fi in {.2. .5, .8} with N up to 30 rounds. As stated in Section 3. for a moderate-horizon N it is reasonable to choose y not too high so that the probability of trade is low at the beginning. We obtain the following results. D Summary of simulation results. Let I > j U > 0 and y,, = y^~". Then the simulations performed show that a,, is Increasing in n and in y, r,, is strictly convex in )i, and, provided N is large enough.
(i) there is always market manipulation, a,, < 0, in the first periods of the tatonnement; (ii) the informativeness of prices is very low during the first stages and increases fast as n gets close to A'; (iii) the conditional volatility of prices var(/7,, [ ;7^-i) maybe hump-shaped or increasing in n and the responsiveness to information of the competitive agents «" U-shaped or decreasing; and (iv) the total expected trading volume is U-shaped. It is easy to generate speeds of learning close to those estimated by Biais, Million, and Spatt (1999) . These authors estimate, in the period in which prices are informative, an order of magnitude for the precision of prices !" of n^ instead of the order n obtained by Vives (1995) for the competitive model. In our model, if we fit a curve of the type Kn^ to T,, -T,, we easily find values for k close to 3 for a range of periods in which r,, is significantly different from r,. For example, with p = r^ = T,, = r,, = 1. ^ = .5,, and A' = 10, considering only periods for which r,, > 1.05T,, we obtain that for y = A (using the last four periods), k = 2.8; for y = .5 (using the last six periods), k = 2.7; for y = .6 (using the last nine periods), k = 2.6.
It is worth noting that the expected length of the tatonnement, for a fixed A', is decreasing in J'. As y tends to one. expected length tends to one, and as y tends to zero, expected length tends to A^. A low y has the benefit of a "long" tatonnement but at the cost of introducing more price manipulation, A high y means a "short" tatonnement with less or no price manipulation. If the objetive is to maximize the expected informafiveness of prices, an interior y will be optimal.
' For the case N = 2at the unique linear equilibrium for y\ close lo /.ero. aj < 0 andai is increasing in yy. ^ We do so given the difficulty in establishing analytically general properties of the equilibrium. Our iterative procedure to compute ihe equilibrium is available upon request. Q.E.D.
. We bave > var(i; -var(y Tbis means tbat tbe conditional volatility of prices is increasing (decreasing) if and only if information revelation accelerates (decelerates) as n increases. Note also tbat if var(u | p,,) is eoncave in n, then !" = {var{v \ />"))"' is convex in n.
In tbe examples tbat follow, illustrated by tbe figures and parametrized by y ranging from .2 to .7, it is assumed that A' = 10, p = T,, = T,;, = T^ = 1, and fi = .5. We comment on the results of tbe simulations for/^ < .6.
Tbe strategic informed trader manipulates the market at the beginning (a,, < 0 for « low (Figure 4) except if y = .7). As a result, tbe informativeness of prices is very low during tbe first stages and increases quite fast as n gets close to N ( Figure 5 ). Tbe conditional volatility of prices var (p,, | p,,-] ) may be bump-sbaped or increasing in n (Figure 6 ). implying tbat tbe responsiveness to information of tbe competitive agents a,, is U-shaped or decreasing, respectively (Figure 7 ). Tbe last situation bappens when y is low (y ~ .2). Tben information revelation accelerates as the tatonnement progresses (var(ii | p,,) is concave in n). Otbcrwi.se, for larger X's, var(f I Pn) is first concave and then convex in n. implying tbat var(/),, | p,,-\) is first increasing and then decreasing in n (Figure 8 ).Tbe total expected trading volume is U-sbaped ( Figure 9 ). and tbe result is driven by tbe fact tbat tbe strategic informed trader's expected trading volume is U-sbaped (Figure 10 ). Tbe explanation is as follows. Tbe expected volume traded by informed traders (ignoring tbe volume traded among competitive informed agents) equals /^£|Vfl| + £' | .-Vn| =iii\an\+{\ -/i)a,,)(var(i' | /?"))'''-. For y not too bigb, tbis volume will bave a U-shaped temporal pattern. The reason is that |Q;,,| has a U-shaped temporal pattern, and the same is true for a^ except when / is low, in which case the evolution of |or,,| dominates and ii\oin\ + (1 -M)^(I also has a U-shaped temporal pattern. This in turn dominates the decreasing tendency of var(I' | p,,). A more detailed illustration of the simulations follows.
D Responsiveness to private information. In Figure 4 we observe that «" is increasing in y and inn. The dynamic behavior of a^ depends on var{/?,, | Pn-\)-In the purely competitive model 
10
(/x = 0), a,, increases monotonically to u,, = T, j p. In the presence of the strategic informed trader, an may be monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing, or U-shaped. If y is sufficiently low (see Figure 1 , y = .2), the strategic informed trader will have very strong incentives to manipulate the market. As a result, prices will purvey almost no information during the first stages, and for n close to N. information revelation will accelerate (var(t' | /?")) concave in n (see Figure 8 ). This implies that sdiip,, \ p,,-\) is monotonically increasing (see Figure 6 ), and as a direct consequence, «" is also monotonically decreasing. On the contrary, if/ is sufficiently high (see Figure 4 , / = .7), the strategic informed trader will not manipulate the market, and informa- u j p,,) ) convex in n (see Figure 8) . Therefore, the conditional volatility of prices will be monotonically decreasing and a,, will be monotonically increasing. For intermediate values of y [y = .6, for example), var(i; | p,,) is first concave and then convex in n. Then,, a,, is U-shaped.
n Informativeness of prices. The price precision T,, is monotonically increasing and convex inn (see Figured) . The informational efficiency ot the proeess is increasing in y. If / is very low (see Figure 5 , y = .2), the strategic informed trader will have very strong incentives to manipulate the market,, and prices will purvey almost no information until n gets very close to A'. If / is suf- The expected volume traded by competitive informed agents, E\y,,,\ = (2/7r)'''-a,, (l/r, -il/rn_i)'''". is monotonicaliy decreasing. The result should hold a fortiori in relation to the competitive model, since now there are cases in which a,, decreases with n. On the other hand, if y increases, the expected volume traded by competitive informed agents tends to be smaller, since prices become more informative sooner.
The expected volume traded by market makers, E\a),,\ = (2/jr)'''-((cr«)-+ {A,,)~/ r,,-i))'^î ncreases with CT,, and A,,, and decreases with T,,_|. Expected volume traded by market makers will be monotonicaliy increasing in n since r,,_i increases more slowly than the average response to private information A,, (because of the strategic behavior by the strategic informed trader).-'*'
The expected total trading volume. -(-o-u}, tends to be U-shaped if / is low, as the strategic informed trader's expected trading volume is U-shaped. On the other hand, if y is high, the expected trading volume coming from the strategic informed trader increases fast and the expected trading volume coming from competitive informed agents decreases relatively slowly. In this case, expected total trading volume will tend to be monotonicaliy increasing. ETVn is driven by the trades of the strategic informed trader (.see Figure 9) .
We shall now briefly analyze the comparative dynamics of the equilibrium with respect to the size of the strategic informed trader ^ and the horizon N.
n Comparative dynamics with respect to /t. U I > fi' > /j. > 0. then the simulations^' show that r,| < r,,. var/j,' < var/),,, and E[TV'J < E [TV,,] . In general, we also have that |a^j < \a,,\ with the possible reversal of the inequality when the a"s are negative and close to zero. The effect of n on a,, and A,, is ambiguous. Furthermore, with the possible exception of short horizons, the expected utility of a single informed competitive agent increases in the presence of the strategic informed trader and in his size //. The expected profit of the strategic informed trader also increases with ii.
That is, in the economy in which the strategic informed trader is smaller (and the competitive sector larger), the strategic informed trader responds more to his private information, prices reveal more information and are more volatile, and there is more trading. If fi' > fi. the effect of the strategic informed trader's demand on the price and on the informativeness of the price is higher, and he becomes more cautious.The expected trading volume is higher in the economy with a larger competitive .sector. Indeed, the expected volume traded by the competitive sector is higher simply because this sector is larger while the trade per agent is more or less the same. Furthermore, market makers trade more as well because they face a less severe adverse selection problem (except perhaps at the end of the horizon). Finally, the expected volume traded by the strategic informed trader, at least in the first periods, is higher since the lower the impact his demand has on prices, the higher his willingness to trade.^"
The previous comparative dynamic results have interesting implications for the relative welfare of the strategic informed trader and the competitive informed agent.s. The expected profits of the strategic informed trader in period n. conditional on there being trade in this period, are '" If there is market manipulation, mosl ot the irading ciimiiig from competitive intbrmed agents is absorbed by the strategic informed trader. As ii increases, the incentives to manipulate the market decrease, anil market makers absorb a higher share of trading coming from the competitive intbrmed sector. At some stage, a,, > 0 and market tiiakers become ihe counterpart for all informed and noise Irading. The eJYect of an increase in /< on ii, is not uniform (if;(' > li Ihere i.s a critical n such thai a', < a, tor f > n and a', > ai for/ < n). An increase in fi decreases r,,. \\ n' > n. then there is a critical n such that (k',)~^ < l^i)"' for I > II and (Xjl '>(>.,)"' forf < ii. Market depth increases with ji at the ftrst stage.s of the process and decreases with H when n gets close to iV. © RAND urn.
given by ^a,J'^n • The expected utility of a competitive informed agent, conditional on there being trade in period/misgiven by -(l+T,/r,, i)"'''-. Given that the presence of the strategicinformed trader tends to make prices less informative (with the possible exception of short horizons), the competitive traders benefit (individually) from it. Furthermore, a larger strategic informed trader makes a,, smaller (when positive) and the price precision r,, also smaller. The simulations .show that the expected profit, txa,,/T,,. in general increases with ji (although a,,JT,, may decrease with li),^^ and therefore the strategic informed trader prefers that the competitive sector be small. We also find that the ex ante expected profit of the strategic informed trader (as of period 0) is increasing in /i.
In summary, an informed competitive trader prefers to have a large informed trader around because then prices are less informalive and the trader can profit from it. while the strategic itiformed trader prefers a small competitive sector. The strategic infortiied trader is creating a positive externality for the competitive informed agents.
• Comparative dynamics with respect to A'. In the purely competitive economy {}i = 0), increasing A' increases the informativeness of prices at the rate of A' and decreases the volume of trading. In the purely strategic version of the model (M = I), for any given y there Is an upper bound for the price precision f, no matter the length A' of the horizon. Our simulations support the conjecture that this is also the case when n > 0.^F or example, with /.i -.5. p = r,. = T,. = r,, = I, and y = .5 as fixed exogenous parameters, we see that crv. ".v. r^, A.V-var(/j,v | PN-\ ). var (/7,v) , and the expected volume traded by the differenttypesof agents all change by less than .001% when N increases from 10 to 20. A larger lA implies a lower limit value for the priee precision, and this limit Is attained in fewer rounds of trade. Let p = r^ = r,, = r,, = 1, and y = .3. Then for (i = .5. f =3.416 and the bound is attained in about 10 rounds (up to 9 decimals); for i.i = A. f = 5.416 and the bound is attained in close to 11 rounds; for/z = .01, f = 6.166 and the bound is attained in less than 15 rounds. In the first case we get within less than \% of the upper bound at / V = 3; in the second, at A' = 4; and in the third, at A' = 5. Indeed, when fi increases, the average responsiveness to information. A,,, tends to decrease, and this affects the informativeness of priees. n Robustness. It is possible to show that the general paltern of results obtained also hold in the case that the strategic and the competitive infortiied agents use demand schedules instead of market orders: In the presence of the strategic informed trader there is market manipulation, price precision is bounded above, and volume is U-shaped.
Concluding remarks
•
In this article we have provided a model of an information tatonnement inspired in the preopening auction of some continuous trading systetns. The interaction between a strategic informed trader and a sector of competitive infortiied agents yields outcomes consistent with the empirical evidence available from the Paris Bourse (Biais, Hillion, and Spatt. 1999) . Indeed, we .see how the presence of the strategic informed trader slows down at first and later accelerates the transmission of information by prices. The price precision tends to increase sharply toward the end of the tatonnement. However, the priee does not fully reveal the fundamental value of the asset, no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has. Furthermore, trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern driven by the strategic informed trader's activity. All these robust findings in our model are consistent with the empirical evidence.
•' •' The conditional e\pecled profit HU,,/T,, may be nonmunotone in fi for intermeJiate values ofn when a is close lo zero.
'"' Simulations have been performed in the following range: /; in {I. 2, 4}. r,,. i,. and r, in (.5. I. 5}. ^( between .01 and I with a step of .05. and y with the same siep from .01 until .5, The upper bound for r is attained in 30 rounds or less. For j/'s up to .7 and n's no smaller than .2. ihe upper bound for r is attained in 40 rounds or less.
At the same time, our tnodel has characterized precisely the market-manipulation strategy of the strategic informed trader in terms of contrarian behavior Indeed, the strategic informed trader attempts to manipulate the market at the beginning of the process by taking an offsetting position to the competitive informed traders. The aim of such a contrarian strategy is to keep the informativeness of prices low. Therefore, at the beginning there is quite a bit of contrarian activity that sub.sequently subsides to active trading in the direction of the information of the strategic informed trader. The presence of the strategic informed trader creates a public good for the competitive informed traders: A low informativeness of the price and opportunities to profit from it. On the other side of the coin, the strategic informed trader would like to keep the competitive informed sector as small as possible.
In summary, the presence of strategic behavior in a context where there are also competitive informed agents yields a temporal pattern of evolution of basic market parameters consistent with the evidence available in the pretrade period in the Paris Bourse. Furthermore, we uncover and characterize the use of a contrarian strategy hy the strategic informed trader to manipulate the market. At the same time, the model makes clear that introducing a random opening time, like in Xetra, limits hut does not eliminate the incentives to manipulate the market. Market manipulation only arises in those periods in which the probability that the market opens is relatively low.
Among the direct extensions of the model that could be explored, we could look at what happens if the strategic informed trader is uncertain about the risk aversion or the precision of information of the competitive traders: what if there is more than one strategic informed trader, or what if the strategic informed trader is risk averse? With respect to the latter issue, the results of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992. 1994) seem to indicate that in such a case, information should be incorporated into prices much more quickly. Another relevant extension would inquire about the incentives to form coalitions of competitive informed traders. The benefit of forming a coalition is to share and improve information ahout the liquidation value of the risky asset. The cost is the intemalization of information leakages and the subsequent incentive to refrain from trading aggressively. Still another extension would consider introducing the costs of submitting orders.
On another front, our model points toward market design to facilitate price discovery and prevent manipulation. For example, can activity rules for traders he devised to improve the performance of the tatonnetiient? This alludes to the more general issue of finding a market design that peribrms well and is robust to changes in the environment. The topic is of relevance for a range of market environments in which agents can revise their trades before the market opens, including electricity auctions and parimutuel hetting as well as the preopening period in stock markets.
we obtain that the optimal strategy of the competitive informed i agent is given by Xjnis,. p"~U = an (v -Pn-\} with a,, =\p(\/T,+Ynr{p,, I p^-i} 
Consider now the problem of the strategic informed trader. At stage n the strategic informed trader will face the following expected profit conditional on his information:
where E{x,,t\ \ v. p""' } is the expected continuation profit. Suppo.se that 
Tn =2[\ -qn{\ -yn)/yn]rn-[
starting from To = r,. Finally //" and Rn are calculated using the equations (2) and (3) above.
CoroltaryAI.
We have that T« =2"T,n;'=|[l -^'(^ -/')//')• Proof. Available upon request. Similar to the methods developed in Holdenand Subrahmanyam (1992) and also in Foster and Viswanathan (1993) . D Equilibrium wilh demand schedules. Consider a version of the general model in which both the strategic and the competitive informed agents submit demand schedules instead of market orders. At stage n. informed agent / submits a demand schedule X,,,(pn-.Si. p""'), contingent on the private signal ,v, he has and the past history of prices. Similarly, the strategic informed trader's strategy at n is a demand function contingent in his private information (v) and past prices, YApn'. V. p""'). As before, noise traders are assumed to submit at round n the order «n. and market makers quote prices efficiently on the basis of public information and the aggregate limit order book, which is just a noisy version of the aggregate orders of informed agents, L,Apn) = y>'n(Pn)+ Xn(pn) + Un, where x^lpn) = /^_ x,,,{pn:'ii.
Pn-[).
Proposition Al. There exists a unique linear equilibrium characterized by (for n = 1 A'): the strategic informed trader's expected continuation profit is given by E{7Zn.y\ \ v, ^ + fiSn. The
•' -^ It should be clear that in equilibrium Hn > 0. A negative Hn means a negative strategic informed trader's expected profit, but the strategic informed trader always has the option not to trade at any time, obtaining a zero (nonrantlom) profit.
- Proof Available on request.
